communication between settler colonies, especially with regards to contemporary debates about Asian migration. By 1904, at the height of Yellow Peril discourse, there were over 5,000 Australians on the Witwatersrand (Rand) region in the Transvaal, and a couple thousand Americans, "bringing with them a strong union tradition and marked antipathies to Asian and 'coolie' labour." 14 When, in 1904, the unelected Transvaal government, with British approval, allowed the controversial importation of Chinese indentured labour despite strong local opposition, the entire settler colonial world took notice. Overall, 63,695 Chinese were imported between 1904 and 1907 within the 40 square miles of the Rand, equivalent to 5 percent of the estimated Transvaal population in 1903.
15 It was these Chinese who were allegedly being scalped.
Throughout 1905-1906, newspapers reported weekly accounts of the Chinese who would escape their compounds and go raiding, particularly targeting isolated farms. Several farmers were killed and a few women and children seriously injured, despite increased (expensive) police cordons and increased security on the gold mines themselves. "Chinese Outrage" was a common headline in British and South African newspapers, appearing at least once a week in most papers, and such stories spread globally via Reuters. In these stories, the Chinese were depicted as threatening South Africa's future as a "white man's colony," economically, sexually and violently. 16 Those stories often combined all of the most sensational aspects of tabloid journalism with all of the racialized and gendered imagery of the Yellow Peril.
The scalping story appeared in an assortment of newspapers in South Africa, Britain, Australia and New Zealand throughout September, October and November 1906. Telegrams allowed the story to appear simultaneously in Britain and South Africa, and most newspapers simply duplicated what the editor wrote in The Prince or copied his telegrams, sent to several leading newspapers in Britain. As was the case in Britain, "the populist coverage of crime" was partly justified as a journalistic creed to "expose the 'truth'" and this meant that journalists increasingly investigated crimes "rather than simply report its revelations in the courtroom." 17 While The Prince clearly considered itself a more serious weekly newspaper, it imbibed many of these new tabloid traits, with the focus on the journalist single-handedly investigating crimes a key component of much of the newspaper. The motto of the newspaper throughout 1906 suggests the centrality of this "mission": "Fearless and Just, the Prince of Critics" appeared at the top of each issue. Indeed, The Prince's controversial editor, George Webb Hardy, had already been imprisoned in 1905 for indecency after publishing sensational material from his investigation into an allegation of "Black Peril," involving a black gardener seducing white girls at a Natal school. 18 Hardy is only remembered now because of his subsequent 1912 novel, The Black Peril, loosely based on the articles. 19 Little is known about Hardy's life before arriving in South Africa, although he is listed as a Cambridge Law graduate in 1892, and seems to have travelled at least to Australia, New York, and through parts of Alaska and Canada, before arriving in Natal in 1901 and founded The Prince as a weekly newspaper. 20 This was a popular, if risky, venture at the time. Independent newspapers were "either treated with suspicion by officialdom, or (more frequently) simply ignored." 21 Several editors were jailed during the Boer War in particular. 22 Despite this, Hardy consistently demonstrated a "willingness to thrust his rhetorical rapier into public officials and to employ unrestrained language in describing both them and public institutions." 23 As a result, his residence in South Africa was marked by a high readership, a degree of infamy and an increasingly acrimonious relationship with local authorities. This was his final exposé, as his newspaper folded upon his return to Britain in early 1907. 23 Hale, 28. 24 It is not clear why he returned to Britain, given the apparent success of his newspaper. The inquest into his suicide in 1922 raises more questions. His brother stated that he had had a nervous breakdown "about twenty years ago" which suggests that either his arrival in Durban in 1901 was a therapeutic change of scenery after this breakdown, or that his departure in 1907 was due to the breakdown. See Dundee Evening Telegraph (UK), 17
Focusing on the actual scalping incident, and situating it within wider media coverage of the Yellow Peril, illuminates a key tension within Sino-Western historiography and colonial scholarship. Inspired by Edward Said's Orientalism, scholars such as Willy R. Berger have argued that European images of China were never about real places, peoples or events. 25 European knowledge creation about China ignored "China as a real country." 26 Certainly, this article will highlight many instances of objectifying China and Chinese people. However, it is incorrect to read this objectification as itself a sign of Western power over the "orient." While the scalping incident seems highly unusual, this case reflected a broader problem at the heart of colonialism. For both white men and the colonial state, power was "dominant but never quite hegemonic."
27 Hegemonic masculinity idealises stereotypes, meaning that, "while men as a group may be dominant and powerful, most men as individuals do not feel powerful."
28 Similarly, the colonial state's power was never absolute, and can be seen as especially fragile in South Africa after the Boer War. Scholars such as Robert Morrell have demonstrated how important re-affirmations of white male unity were in racially and class divided societies like South Africa. 29 Thus the hegemonic dominance of the colonial state and the "white" male was always relational and "always contestable." 30 The Chinese were not colonised, were considered hard working, and were numerous. The objectification of Chinese men in Yellow Peril discourse was both a sign of colonial male power and weakness. This apparent contradiction can be explained by considering the trophy collecting of the scalps. This article particularly draws on Homi Bhabha's argument that nations need to create a shared history, which gives them a shared ideology and legitimacy, a sense of "deep, horizontal comradeship." It cements who "us" is, that feeling of groupness, and who is excluded. That history has to be constantly performed to maintain that groupness. If that performance ever ceases, then that groupness also ceases to exist. This constant performance, however, allows exclusion and inclusion to constantly be renegotiated, and means that real coherence and groupness is never attainable. Each performance of the nation is an attempt to end the debate, to cement the power and unity of the nation, but each performance actually opens the debate about who is in the group anew.
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Bhabha's ideas were specifically about nations, but can be applied equally well to the precariousness of South Africa as a "white" settler colony. In this context, it is about the performance, not of national identity, but of white male colonial power. Whiteness was a category that constantly needed to be performed, precisely because who to include and exclude was never clear-cut. Afrikaners and British had fought a brutal war for almost three years; anti-Semitism was rife, but some saw them as a welcome addition to the overall "white" population; and there was growing anxiety about bywoners, or poor whites.
32 Whiteness, male hegemony and settler colonial rule were equally fragile and in need of constant performance. And for a variety of reasons I shall discuss, that performance of white male colonial identity increasingly focused on the Chinese other, an other often represented by their hair.
A SOCIAL HISTORY OF CHINESE HAIR
In most societies, hair has been used by individuals to express themselves and by societies to regulate themselves. 33 The Mandarin Chinese name for the braid hairstyle was bianzi, 辮子, and had been used to describe any braided hair on males or females since at least the ninth century. 34 The Manchus imported the specific braid hairstyle when they invaded China in 1644.
One of their chief means of forcing the population to submit to colonial conquest was by requiring all Chinese men to shave off all hair at the front of the head above the temples and the rest of the hair would be braided at the back of the head. Refusal was punishable by execution. While there was much initial resistance to this hair style, by the nineteenth century it was ubiquitous. 35 It had become a physical symbol of one's gendered and national identity. Even if the braid was removed without the owners" consent, the loss of it could cause considerable social distress and ostracism, as Philip Kuhn has shown during a queue-cutting panic in 1768.
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Hair was also an important part of the way the Chinese identified and judged "others." Seventeenth century Chinese accounts of European traders or missionaries focused on "their beards, which were 34 The coming of age rituals for men and women involved dressing the hair in a formal, often intricate, knot on top of the head. Furthermore, "caring for and protecting hair was a component of Confucian rites" since it was given by parents to their children, as laid out in the Analects. The Analects also specified that only barbarians wore their hair "unbound"; increasingly elaborate hairstyles became symbols of Chinese civilization. Various Chinese folklores attributed magical powers to hair as well, and a useful ( 35 There was no such regulation for female hair styling, emphasizing how the body politic of Chinese nationhood at this time was decidedly masculine. Firth, 262-298 contains speculation that such male-centred hair-styling reflected the more overtly public social roles of men in "Oriental" societies. While his comments remain some of the most thoughtful interpretations of hair's social significance, his classifications of "Western" and "Oriental" invite further study. 36 Kuhn, 1-29. Losing one's braid could result in being banned from one's village and disowned by one's family, so seriously was the matter taken, especially in rural areas. Zhang, 165-181.
negatively contrasted with the careful grooming and smoothness of Chinese men." The hairiness of Europeans was also depicted as transgressing "boundaries of age . . . since the long beard was a symbol of seniority in the Confucian universe," and boundaries of gender, with European women often depicted as having hairy faces.
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At the end of the nineteenth century, a small but growing number of educated Chinese men cut their hair while studying abroad, particularly in Japan. "The queue style, a source of foreign ridicule and insults, such as 'pigtail,' 'the tailed lackey,' and 'half-shaved monk,' was apparently detrimental to China's international prestige."
38 Diaspora communities also increasingly adopted "Western" hairstyles; in South Africa, written and visual sources suggest that the queue was very rare by 1900. For these men, cutting the braid became a symbol of the birth of Chinese modernity and removed a cause of international ridicule, while the idea that short hair was more hygienic also spread. 39 The braid hairstyle was became intrinsically linked to the idea of modernisation and was banned, on pain of death, during the Wuchang Uprising in October 1911.
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However, such queue cutting was very much the exception. In 1906, men who cut their braids were largely limited to overseas Chinese, students and Christians. 41 It was also common for them to purchase fake braids to wear in public. Chinese men who cut their braids were not always allowed back into China and could be severely ostracised, as several of Lu Xun's short stories from the early twentieth century recall. 42 Legally, the punishment of execution still existed, although this was no longer actually implemented. Chinese scholars debate how quickly the general population embraced shorter hair, and it is clear that for both sides, the hair was a declaration of competing images of Chinese nationhood and male identity.
The Chinese I am discussing were poor indentured labourers, mostly from Shantung, a poor and northern region of China, and photographs suggest most retained their braid hairstyles while in South Africa. 43 This may have simply reflected the fact that their migration was temporary and would be repatriated, unlike the permanent Chinese population, who had strong links to the Chinese nationalist movement headed by Sun Yat-Sen. 44 
THE QUEUE AND PIGTAIL
From the earliest days of modern interactions between Europeans and Chinese, Europeans were mesmerised by the braid hairstyle. 45 It became a representation of Chinese superstition, as well as a visually striking feature ripe for caricature. The very terminology used to describe the Chinese and their hair denoted this. The French term queue, or tail, became the standard Western term. 46 Although similar in meaning, "pigtail" was decidedly slang and insulting. Both words fell into widespread use in the eighteenth century to describe hair gathered at the nape of the neck and hanging either in a braid or as a low ponytail, usually by European soldiers or sailors. 47 It is less clear when the Chinese hairstyle started being called this, 48 but both queue and "pigtail" were clearly widespread in English by the mid-nineteenth century. 49 The traffic of Chinese indentured workers became known as the "pig trade" and the Chinese themselves were commonly known as "pigs" or "pigtails," even in places like South Africa with a tiny Chinese population before the 1904 indenture scheme began. 50 The Natal Mercury in 1881 claimed: "our police court reports are already beginning to tell of a dozen of the pigtail wearers being fined for gambling on a Sunday morning." 51 The Chinese were not people as such, they were "The gentlemen of the pigtail." The term "pigtail" was also applied to people associated with Chinese stereotypes, such as being "old-fashioned, pedantic, or excessively formal." For instance, in the run-up to the 1906 general election, the term "pigtail Tory" was popularised because of their introduction of the Chinese labourers into South Africa. The term was not a compliment. 53 Image 2 shows a British lion having his braid cut off by the prime minister, Henry Campbell-Bannerman, who stopped the importation scheme to South Africa upon taking office. A sign in the background announces that the barber is "under entirely new management." Much of the 1906 election campaign focused on the idea that unionists put profit before national and racial honour. 54 The hair here clearly symbolises the idea that Britain itself had become contaminated racially and morally through using Chinese indentured labour. 53 "Pigtail," OED Online. 54 See Bright, Chinese, chapter 4: "A Matter of National Honour." 55 The Prince (Transvaal), 13 January 1906, 50: "What is the value of British honour compared with the gold wrung from the stones, less hard that their own consciences, by the The queue was often singled out for special mention in descriptions of the Chinese in the nineteenth century. The Treaty of Tianjib in 1858 meant that missionaries could go into China's interior and there was a huge increase in popular writings about China, especially from missionaries. They often described the Chinese' lack of facial hair as a moral and racial failing; while European and American hairiness was held up as signifying "physical and moral strength, manly dignity, a higher state of culture, and individual freedom," the apparent inability of Chinese men to grow beards indicated a racial and moral inability to be proper men. This notion was exacerbated by the queue, which was deemed "unnaturally feminizing." 56 The queue became "not merely the outward mark of subjection, but the cause of a subdued and broken will power."
57 So ingrained was the link between the hairstyle and race that Robert K. Douglas, professor of Chinese Studies at Kings College, London, and a Chinese expert for the British Museum, thought it denoted "the character of the people."
58 George Orwell's famous essay on "Boy's Weeklies" in 1940 reflected a visual imagining of Chinese men which had been firmly in place within the English-speaking world since at least the mid-nineteenth century (and which had ceased to exist in reality since the 1911 revolution).
The assumption all along is not only that foreigners are comics who are put there for us to laugh at, but that they can be classified in much the same way as insects. That is why in all boys' papers . . . a Chinese is invariably portrayed with a pigtail. It is the thing you recognize him by, like the Frenchman's beard or the Italian's barrel-organ. 59 aid of the Chinese? Small, indeed, it must be when a British Administration connives at the degrading of its own subjects." Here, the Chinese presence is specially associated with the loss of British masculine and national esteem. They are "degraded" and "insulted" by the Chinese presence. 56 Attempts were even made to tax the hairstyle in the United States, Australia and Canada, as a way to discourage Chinese migrants. 60 Many commentators, especially in Britain, emphasised the comedic nature of the hairstyle. Erasmus Doolittle wrote in 1830 that one's first impulse was to laugh at the "spaniel's tail." 61 The ridicule of the Chinese in this way was perhaps most obvious in theatrical portrayals of the Chinese. Anne Veronica Witchard has argued that comic drawings combined with stage representations of the Chinese in Britain so that, by the mid-nineteenth century, "the image of the Chinese was inseparable from their pantomime representation, while the reality of China was thought quite as ludicrous as its stage counterpart."
62 Sean Metzger has made a similar argument about stage depictions in the United States, with performances full of queue jokes. 63 In fact, he claims that it "appears more than any other signifier in various nineteenth-century visual portrayals of Chinese immigrants" in the United States. 64 Such depictions emphasised the clearest representation of the difference between United States and Chinese respective civilisations and masculinities. By referring to the braid and the Chinese in such a derogatory manner, and comparing them with animals, they became an object of amusement and curiosity rather than a threat to "white" male dominance; it demeaned and trivialised Chinese cultural and physical traits, much like when African hair was called "wool."
65 Fear and comedy were often combined in frequent depictions of violent assaults targeting the braid in nineteenth century plays and stories, moments of light relief and white male physical power. In one short story, copied widely from the Pall Mall Gazette, "How We Bested the Chinkies: An Australia Experiment," one of the heroic male protagonists grabbed a "Chinaman by his pigtail," threw him "to the ground," and called him a "'monkey-faced lisper'."
66 Such humour was always easier in Britain, which felt less threatened by any imminent invasion of Chinese men, although it could be found in the settler colonies as well.
The associations with the braid were not always so light-hearted, however. As hundreds of thousands of Chinese men were migrating to California, Australia, Canada, and New Zealand, depictions of the queue were directly linked to fears of real Chinese men. 67 An Australian newspaper thought: "Their huge pigtails hanging well below their waist make them appear like some terrible man-animal."
68 In Australia and the United States in particular the visual imagery often played on the idea of the braid as a rope, either for the Chinese to ensnare colonials or for colonials to control the Chinese.
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In Image 3, a Chinese "coolie" with rotting pointed teeth is seen using his braid to strangle a man with "South Africa" written on his shirt. His bony legs with pointed toenails are wrapped tightly around the figure, who sweats (and who bears a resemblance to Alfred Milner, the High Commissioner of South Africa at the time). A gold mine can be seen in the background. The use of the braid in this way reflected a tradition in the United States and Australia since at least the midnineteenth century, one which was becoming increasingly widespread. 70 Probably the first Yellow Peril novel was M. P. Shiel's highly successful The Yellow Danger (1898 the villain, Dr. Yen How, it is described as a "contest of strengths . . . a resemblance-of the larger national contest which was impending." Hardy wraps the "pigtail . . . in a single coil tight around Yen's throat." In Hardy's "right hand was a revolver, representing the Science of Western Civilisation, which, however, Yen's grip rendered ineffectual; and in his left hand was Yen's pigtail, representing the barbarism, the superstition, the repulsive soul of the East. Yen's face darkened . . . The rat was being suffocated by its own tail. The West was strangling the East." Ross Forman has argued that such fictional depictions acted as a symbolic castration, although the motives could be more diverse. 72 As Image 4 demonstrates, "white" residents could also use violence directed at the queue to critique ideas of manhood within settler societies. Here Thomas Nast is portraying the brutal assault of a Chinese man by "California," a hairy, angry man with a whip (who himself resembles Nast's racialized drawings of Irish men). Such violence towards the Chinese is here partly comic, relying on an overexaggerated stereotypical Chinese appearance, contrasted with a rough, uncivilised Western manhood. This is less about dominance over the Chinese as a critique of direct violence towards the Chinese; such debates about how much violence colonial men could use without jeopardising their "civilising mission" were commonplace in American and European empire-building, and were frequently highly gendered, with class and religion featuring prominently. 73 In addition to a growing body of fantastical Yellow Peril fiction, there was a greater awareness that there were real Chinese men with real hair, not just a vague idea of Chinese people far away. Sean Metzger has described how a panic erupted in the United States around the making of wigs and hair pieces from Chinese hair, with such headlines as "Death Lurks in Chinese Pigtails." 74 He has argued that this caused anxiety because it was "the literal integration of Chinese hair into American industrial production, even as the rest of their bodies were increasingly filtered out of this project during the first decades of the twentieth century." 75 My own research shows that this trade, and the ensuing panic, was not unique to the United States. During this same period, Britons also became aware that some hair pieces were made with Chinese hair. In a widely reported inquest in Bradford, England, a woolcombing factory worker died of anthrax. When he fell ill, the deceased had just opened a bag containing human hair from China, "'just as if it had been cut from a Chinaman's head and rolled up'" and still "in pigtails," presumably taken from dead bodies, and possibly suffering from "horrible disease," according to the factory foreman.
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On the coroner's orders, the inquest was adjourned for a fortnight so the hair (and two other deaths from anthrax at the same premises) could be investigated. 77 Less widely reported was the coroner's eventual conclusion that the Chinese hair was fine. 78 Most newspapers retained sensational and misleading headlines like "CHINESE PERIL. Anthrax in Pigtails." 79 This commercial use of Chinese hair in women's wigs suggested a hidden biological hybridity, of Chinese incursion into domestic spaces, a corruption of racial and gender purity.
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Later that year, several stories appeared in Australian newspapers, almost verbatim, anxiously reflecting on the use of Chinese hair in the making of wigs and hair pieces generally. 81 Such stories emphasised the idea of vulnerable women being contaminated by Chinese men. As one newspaper mused: "Fancy patting a hair-frame made up from the plagued combings of a diseased Celestial, and stretching one's own carefully tilled and garnished tresses over a defunct's pigtail!" 82 This intersection of comedy and fear embodied why Chinese hair was so often an object of interest, and both why it was commodified and why that commodification was so problematic.
Real-world encounters were often violent (and, despite Image 3, I have only found stories of Europeans using the braids violently, never the Chinese themselves). An anti-Chinese Australian demanded that they should "take each individual Celestial by the queue and swing him to the depths of the Pacific if he won't clear out for the asking." 83 In a few cases in Australia and California, braids were forcefully cut during violent attacks. 84 Similarly, during the Opium Wars, there were reports of victorious British crews cutting off their defeated Chinese opponents "tails," and keeping them as trophies.
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In South Africa too, there were such cases. An investigation into allegations that white overseers were brutalising Chinese workers found that the practice of pulling Chinese men by their hair was common. 86 The
Daily Mail alleged in early 1906 that a widely reproduced photograph of a Chinese man being tied up by his hair (used as a rope) and tortured was staged deliberately by a mine manager with a grievance against his employers. However, this denouncement of the photograph as "fake" was rather problematic, because, regardless of the reasons, the "Chinaman's hands were tied up with his pigtail," and he was left for ten hours without food or water in order to take the photograph. 87 There were at least two criminal convictions for white miners cutting off Chinese men's hair while drunk; in both cases, large fights ensued. 88 In cases of such violent acquisition, hair was cut partly for trophy purposes, and partly because of the association with Chinese manhood. In this situation, cutting off a Chinese man's hair could be a signifier of European dominance of China itself. 89 However, negative media coverage reflected a belief that the white men were responsible for violent disorder, 90 caused a "loss of prestige," a loss of respect of coloured men for white men. 91 Here, a playful, comedic attitude towards the Chinese could itself become dangerous and threaten white hegemony.
These portrayals of the queue-comic, diseased, an object of violence-all demonstrate how much the imagery of the Yellow Peril was connected to the insecurities of settler societies. In South Africa in 1906, these anxieties were accentuated by a serious economic depression, despite initial promises that Chinese indentured labour would create jobs for white workers. The economic stagnation was a clear threat to male prestige: white men could not provide for their families, maintain a civilised lifestyle, nor could the size of the British population increase while the depression (and the Chinese scheme) continued. In South Africa, as elsewhere, colonial manhood was defined by the ability of men to be independent economically and support a family, as well as strong elements relating to physical health and strength, and an emphasis on natural leadership over women and the "native" population. There was also a widespread belief that the Chinese were too racially and sexually ambivalent, that they did not fit clearly into the existing hierarchies. White mine managers frequently complained that the Chinese did not "know their place," and this in turn was often used as a justification for violence towards Chinese men. 92 Even before the scalping story, The Prince had a long editorial about the threat that the Chinese posed to white men on the gold mines of Johannesburg:
Side by side with men . . . of a superior race, they [the Chinese] lounged, their hair tails coiled around their semi-shaved heads-in itself a deadly insult in the East-with scornful demeanour and contemptuous glance at the poor white man . . . A small thing, perhaps, this lamentable loss of British prestige. 93 Here, the Chinese presence is directly linked to the loss of British masculine and national esteem. They are "degraded" and "insulted" by the Chinese presence. The very way they wore their hair was an insult, since in China (according to this story), it was considered disrespectful to pin up the braid. One Australian newspaper made a similar complaint about this habit of pinning up the hair, comparing this to dogs' tails being erect or relaxed. Pinning the hair up, like an erect dog's tail showed "combativeness and insolence," something explicitly deemed incompatible with "White Australia" in the article. 94 Marilyn Lake has shown how the formation of a federated white Australia in 1901 was fundamentally linked to the image of Australian manhood, civilization and national identity.
95 D. Walker has described white Australian masculinity at this time as a white "warrior," ready to defeat an Asian invasion. 96 In the United States, Floyd Cheung has shown how "authentic" American national identity and manliness were partly created through othering Chinese-American men as "'not quite' American and 'not quite' men." 97 More widely, the desire "to offset feelings of masculine inadequacy" has been called "hypermasculinity," a phenomenon often associated with violence. Violently assaulting the braid or mocking it as a symbol of Chinese racial and masculine identity was a powerful way of exercising social dominance and white male groupness, although acts of violence could also demonstrate the divisions within settler societies.
White colonists were preoccupied with dominating the Chinese. This dominance could be through acts of violent assault, through mockery or through knowledge acquisition. White South Africans have often been depicted as particularly divided, anxious and fearful during this post-Boer War period. While most research has focused on the Black Peril or poor whites, 99 at this particular moment and time, these issues were embodied by the Yellow Peril. Especially amongst British settlers, this discourse allowed them to feel that their situation fit within a wider battle for white male supremacy, not just in South Africa but also in the United States, Australia, Canada and New Zealand. The language of the "pigtail" in South Africa fits perfectly alongside such discourses, and was a key part of the performance of colonial manhood, particularly on the Rand gold mines.
This obsession with Chinese hair styles and the broader problem of the Chinese presence in supposedly white settler colonies was strikingly evident in the confidential testimony given during the official enquiry held by John A. S. Bucknill "into certain allegations as to the prevalence of unnatural vice and other immorality amongst the Chinese indentured labourers employed on the mines of the Witwatersrand" throughout September 1906. It investigated newspaper accusations that the mine owners and government were allowing "unnatural vice" to occur. The men who gave evidence were all European men who lived in China for a significant number of years (some were born there), and migrated to South Africa to act as Chinese experts. These experts were largely unanimous in believing that they could pick out men "of this type" (e.g., sodomites) by "the method in which they dress their hair, the appearance of the queue or pigtail and certain peculiarities of dress and general appearance." 100 The evidence of Charles Duncan Stewart, Inspector Interpreter of Chinese Police for the Transvaal Town Police, exemplifies this. Born in China, he lived there until he came to South Africa eighteen months before with the Chinese. He explained that the "bad character[s]" were "very effeminate looking and braid their hair out and wear a fringe."
101 Similar descriptions were provided by James Edward Cooke, Chinese Interpreter to the chief Magistrate in Johannesburg, who was born in China, travelled throughout Asia for the American Trading Co. and had lived in Australia as well as South Africa. He thought that as many as 60 to 70 percent of all of the Chinese "boys" were practicing sodomy on the mines, an opinion partly based on "the way he does his hair up."
102 Such a man, according to Cooke, "has usually more of a woman's look; he speaks more like a woman than a man; he has not a manly appearance."
103 A few other "experts" also associated male prostitution with this female hairstyle but argued instead that the Chinese knew such behaviour would be unacceptable (or even illegal) in the colony, so tried to hide their hair in order to hide their sexual identity.
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All of the witnesses made a clear link between hairstyle and sexuality. One witness claimed that a Chinese word, written in the evidence notes as "zungpientze," meant both "loose queue" and "loose fellow," indicating an alleged Chinese link between hair and sexual morality. 105 It is difficult to accurately explain this depiction of Chinese homosexuality and there were no Chinese witnesses. Chinese historians have documented a complicated culture of homosexuality which evolved in China, shaped by gender, age and status, in which 100 British National Archives, Colonial Office Records (CO), CO537/540, 60- male prostitution was common. 106 However, there was a social stigma to being the passive partner in a homosexual relationship and it was also increasingly socially condemned as a threat to family unity and reproduction. 107 The suggestion in the Bucknill Report that male prostitutes dressed in a particular way to advertise their services is also difficult to determine, as most Chinese archival records relate to elite actors (indeed, operas were often written to include a number of crossdressing male roles). It was not uncommon for such actors to dress as women and adopt "passive" sexual behaviours, but it is simply not clear how widespread such practices were outside of urban wealthy communities. 108 What these comments do suggest is that some Chinese indentured workers participated in a kind of "gender performativity" at odds with both Western and Chinese gender norms. 109 The fringe described by experts certainly suggests a more typically female hairstyle than the shaved forehead required in China.
Ultimately, the Governor decided that the alleged look of Chinese men could have "given no more than grounds for a suspicion"; only a full medical examination would prove whether they were homosexuals, which was considered impractical to enforce. 110 The report was kept confidential but the fact that all of the witnesses spent such a large amount of time discussing Chinese hair styles is significant. It is clear the "experts" involved in the report thought that knowing about the social signifiers of Chinese hair would help them, not just understand the Chinese, but control the Chinese. It reduced Chinese men to easily categorised characteristics. Although the Chinese were not colonised, colonisers still sought to "exercise the authority of Western knowledge systems" to control and contain the Chinese. 111 The uncertainty rife within the discussions, and the ultimate conclusion that "seeing" Chinese sexuality was not as simple as hair, at least legally, embodied a problem of the colonial state, whose power was "dominant but never quite hegemonic."
112 This was, in the end, not about colonial knowledge being used to control Chinese bodies; it was an attempt and it failed.
So, in China, the distinctive braid hairstyle worn by men was a marker of national and gendered identity. While some educated elites and migrants had begun to remove it, the poor labourers imported to South Africa seem largely to have retained their traditional hairstyles. 113 Westerners recognised that this hairstyle was significant, although they were not always clear why. The language used to describe this hairstyle embedded a language of superiority into any discussion about China, with its references to superstition and animals. As the most visible sign of Chinese otherness, it was frequently referenced on stage and in stories, often for comedic effect, and it also became an object of violence and commodification. This in turn led to fears of contamination. Underlying all of the ways Westerners read Chinese hair was a tension which also lay at the heart of the colonial project itself. These depictions of the Chinese hairstyle and the violent attacks on the hair were supposed to signify the power of white colonial men and of Western civilisation more broadly. However, they had to assert their authority and dominance through a hyper-masculinity precisely because they felt threatened. What was meant to demonstrate hegemonic power actually signified insecurity, especially in places like South Africa, where Chinese men were seen to threaten the delicate economic and racial advantages of white male settler colonialism. This insecurity meant that there was a constant need to reassert such dominance. A similar process was at work in China itself, with the Manchu assertion of the hair style over the population, followed by the Republic's assertion of its removal, on pain of death. In both cases, relatively weak colonisers were using the hairstyles to symbolise power (official state power in China, unofficial white male hegemony in settler 111 Ballantyne, 179. societies), but this was only necessary precisely because they were relatively weak.
COMMODIFICATION
In this context, it is unsurprising that white male mastery became bound up with owning the scalp of a Chinese murderer. The scalp as a human trophy is a good representation of the hyper-masculine need to dehumanise and control, grounded within European habits of collecting, nor is it the only example within colonial historiography. Indeed, rather than treat this case as exceptional, we need to understand how typical such behaviour could be in colonial settings. Karen Dubinsky has noted that one visitor to Niagara Falls claimed to see a "'real scalp of an Indian, duly labelled and consisting of a triangular piece of skin' for sale in an Indian bazaar." Utilising the work of art historian Ruth Phillips, Dubinsky argues that this "desire to mimic, consume, and possess that which is despised" was part of a European process of "'ritual displacement'."
114 By taking the braid, or even just owning the braid, power could be restored and fear banished. The men involved seem to have placed a value on the scalps partly for their rarity and supposed "authenticity," compared to other souvenirs. It provided proof "that their owners were there."
116 Such a motivation certainly seems to apply to the myriad postcards and other collectables available on the Rand at the time. The infamy of the Chinese murders would lend a particular lustre to such trophies, as would their rarity. Sarah Chenab has argued that "hair possesses an almost talismanic quality of authenticity that is lacked by other, nonbiological forms of recording and collecting 'race'." 117 The evidence certainly suggests this idea of racial authenticity was important. Wheeler, the prisoner who confessed to the scalping, allegedly told the photographer that "if the scalp were pickled or tanned it would make a cap." The ticket examiner who overheard this conversation "remarked it would be an [excellent] acquisition to a wardrobe for a fancy dress ball." 118 There was no concern for the dead body; rather the emphasis was on the authenticity and originality of such an item, perfect for performing Chinese identity at a costume party. Similarly, the supposed ability of the scalp to reveal some sort of racialized "truth" about the Chinese was evident in The Prince's coverage. Along with a photograph of the actual scalp, the newspaper widely circulated evidence from two doctors who somehow identified the scalp as definitively "Chinese," using a "scientific" identification process.
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This sort of commodification, however, was not available to all white men in the colony. It is worth examining the fact that all the cases of violent acquisition found involved working class men. By contrast, "gentlemen" collected scientific specimens. The back rooms of museums were increasingly filled with pornographic artefacts and human body parts (including over 5,000 pieces of human hair at London's Natural History Museum), made acceptable because they were collected for "scientific" research rather than merely for public display. 120 Such censorship demonstrated a concern with "the 'correct' modes of viewing" and the stereotypical susceptibility of youths, women and working classes to "morally ambiguous experiences." 121 The rumoured private ownerships and viewings of these scalps reflected this class-based separation between the violent acquisition (a working class affair and not quite honourable) and a middle class respectable ownership. Besides, surely one of the attractive elements of owning such an item was its exclusivity as a souvenir, a real "pigtail" from one of the infamous Chinese murderers! The hunting analogy works well here. Just as conservation laws being established in the United States and British empire were largely based on assumptions that only the upper white classes could harness and appreciate nature responsibly, so too only upper class men could respectably possess and master the Chinese braid. 122 Simon Harrison has argued that human trophyism is usually associated with societies which celebrate hunting as an integral part of manhood. It is also an important part of marking the enemy as sub-human, of declaring dominance over the conquered foes during warfare. 123 Southern African colonial culture also celebrated masculine hunting and warfare, and they portrayed the Chinese as sub-human. Violence was a prevalent feature of frontier life in Southern Africa, 124 and colonials in their imagery and actions regularly blurred the lines between hunting animals and human conflict. 125 Human trophies, in such an environment, were as collectable as animal ones. Thus there existed long-standing othering practices which allowed the scalping to occur. The violence, or at least violation, inherent in the methods of collecting braids indicates that a degree of dehumanisation was at work.
However, while hunting trophies could be publicly displayed, the scalp's messy origins revealed a confused mess of mastery and ungentlemanly violence. Indeed, the culprits-white working class men-were already subject to criticism from much of the British administration and press for their violence towards the Chinese labourers and their propensity to drink and swear. 126 Newspapers largely portrayed the men involved as an aberration from the ideal of British manhood: "Chinese murderers had been made the playthings of prison officials seeking for trophies for their drawing-room tables." 127 Scalping itself also clearly recalled the acts of Native American warriors, arguably the most admired "savages" in Victorian and Edwardian adventure stories. 128 A poem entitled "The Barber Barbarous" made fun of the entire situation:
This mock heroic poem sends up the perpetrators as "shams" of the Native American-style of manhood. The act of collection becomes both an attempt to attain primal victory over the Chinese foe, and a barbarous act which discredits the British man.
NEWSPAPER COVERAGE
The actual reality of scalping a dead body, however, was a story that both newspapers and the government were unsure how to "read." The story appeared in an assortment of newspapers in South Africa, Britain, Australia, and New Zealand throughout Autumn 1906, spread often verbatim via telegram. The Prince's sales considerably increased, with it apparently becoming the largest circulating weekly paper in South Africa, and the copying of the story globally suggests there was an appetite for details. 130 However, this story was simply too complex, and few newspapers outside of The Prince devoted more than one article to it. One Australian editorial explained that "nothing is darker than the desecration of the dead and the mutilation of the mortal remains of a brother man," making this "un-English, a barbarous and an illreligious act."
131 Still, many also found space to wonder if there had not been some terrible misunderstanding. It was far easier to think of it as a bizarre one-off, or even untrue, as something atypical, rather than reflecting the racial, class and gendered tensions within colonialism itself. An Editorial in the Transvaal Leader (a popular uitlander newspaper, owned by the Cape Times Ltd., and renowned for being both sober and imperialistic) 132 even tried to discredit the story, apparently with government collusion. Its editor argued that the Chinese prisoners had voluntarily had their hair cut and claimed to have made "careful enquiries" with the relevant officials, which "enabled" the editor "to state authoritatively" that no scalping had occurred at all. The picture in the newspaper was a fake, they claimed, although prison officials knew the allegations were true by this time. 133 It directly referenced an incident earlier in 1906 when some soldiers sold photographs allegedly of the dead body of Bhambatha, a leader in the 1906 Zulu Rebellion, which later proved to be fake. 134 The official narrative was that, after battle, some British soldiers cut off the head from Bhambatha's body so that they could take it to camp for positive identification. After this was done, the head was returned to the body and both were respectfully buried. However, rumours persisted that he had escaped, or that the British soldiers had treated the corpse disrespectfully, taking photographs and the like. While most photographs produced over the decades have been proven fake, even today it is not entirely clear about all of them. 135 In fact, the Leader's Editorial argued that the Chinese prisoners had voluntarily had their hair cut and so the entire story was a non-story. It certainly seems true that four Chinese men were observed by multiple witnesses having their braids cut off and given to prison staff before their execution (which were later sold), the week before the scalping incident. Whether this was voluntarily done was unclear. 136 The Prince was unsurprisingly vocal in dismissing this interpretation, reminding readers that "high caste Chinamen are now abandoning the pigtail" but not "the ultra-conservative coolie." 137 Similarly, the visiting MP for Cirencester, Richard Walter Essex, "has travelled extensively in China, and knows the customs of the Chinese from A to Z" and "ridicules the insane theory of the Transvaal Leader" that the hair was "'clipped' at their own request." 138 In fact, the story only got widespread coverage internationally once Essex returned to the UK from a visit to South Africa in November 1906 with "a photograph of the scalp and pigtail." 139 The picture was presented as "proof" that the scalping story was true, and more broadly as proof of the Chinese indentured labour scheme's "failure" and Britain's own moral culpability. 140 However, the responses to the scalping incident also demonstrates an awareness that the Chinese men were not simply foils for debating British manhood; they really existed. This was the same impulse that made the Chinese comic and scary. A sentence repeated in almost any newspaper coverage of the scalping reflects this: "The Chinese religion makes this incident one of special significance." 141 On the one hand, this statement relied on certain stereotypes about Chinese culture rather than any reality about Chinese religion. The hairstyle was not religious. However, the statement was worth repeating over and over again precisely because real Chinese men might react negatively to the story, and that would have consequences. The Boxer Rebellion was fresh in the public's memory, and such a desecration of Chinese men might have sparked more anti-Western events in China. Furthermore, the Chinese had successfully boycotted U.S. goods in 1905, because of America's restrictions on Chinese migrants. Increasingly Western powers had to recognise that offending Chinese national pride could have consequences. 142 It was far easier to think of the scalping as a bizarre one-off, or even untrue.
These newspaper silences, and the possible interpretations of that silence, have parallels with reporting of homosexuality trials both in Britain and Australia. Robert Aldrich has mused that such silence may have reflected "a moral horror so great that certain crimes could not even be mentioned" or simply an awareness that such cases were not isolated. 143 As with suggestions of homosexuality, this case simply did not reflect the image of masculinity which South Africans and Britons wanted to believe in and project to the outside world. After all, during the 1906 Bhambatha rebellion, similar accusations were made against the Zulu. Zulus reportedly collected body parts from dead British soldiers for intelezi medicine. In at least one instance, a British soldier with a particularly magnificent moustache had it removed, along with his penis, left forearm and upper lip. 144 It would be difficult for Britain now to admit to the practice themselves.
The alleged buyers were senior government officials. Senior administrators in the government belonged to the upper middle classes; most of them have become famous as part of Milner's Kindergarten, an elite band of Oxford graduates largely hand-picked by Alfred Milner, the Governor of the South African colonies from 1895 until 1903. 145 Even the less senior officials were primarily British and middle class, with some form of public school education. They were the exemplars of what colonial officials should be. To demonstrate that they had collected scalps in such a gruesome manner would have been damaging to their reputations, as well as to Britain's. In the war of civilisations, this was decidedly the wrong image of colonial masculinity and race.
It also seems likely that "Hardy's image as a maverick in the eyes of the colonial government" probably influenced the ways that the colonial government and newspapers responded to his allegations in The Prince.
146 He certainly believed there was a cover-up and several times sent a flurry of cables "Home to all the leading English papers" to promote the story. 147 Furthermore, the Bucknill investigation into Chinese sexual practices was ongoing and there was little appetite to launch another large investigation.
Initially reluctant to believe the story and pictures in The Prince, the Director of Prisons had all prisoners and prison guards interviewed and at least five different ex-prisoners signed sworn affidavits confirming that they had worked with various prison officers to secure scalps from executed Chinese prisoners. However, the prison investigation led to only one arrest warrant, and only after the warder deserted; if he had stayed in place, it seems unlikely that he would have ever been charged. The Prison Board, who had conducted the investigation, were clearly keen to minimise the number of incidents. 148 Significant people were never questioned, like the doctor, although all of the scalpings occurred in his medical room at the prison. 149 The general solution was to stop investigating and dismiss the incident as an aberration perpetrated by working class criminals. The actual investigation's findings were not made public.
CONCLUSION
As the most visible sign of Chinese difference, the violent conquest and commodification of Chinese hair became about exerting colonial, white male hegemony. Turning the Chinese scalp into a human trophy showed, however, how fractured "white" settler society actually was. This became a story about anxiety over manhood and race, rather than a story of white male dominance. This insecurity meant that there was a constant need to reassert dominance through an "us" versus "them" performance: the "us" was constructed as modern, white and manly, contrasted with a Chinese "them," who were depicted as superstitious, backwards, dirty and feminine. At the same time, of course, these discourses also reveal the ruptures, the lack of coherence about who was white and what appropriate manly behaviour was. For some, collecting hair was acceptable but for others, it represented racial decline in the colonies. The various depictions of the Chinese and their hair became foils for differing versions of white manhood to be performed. Mastery and unity had to be asserted precisely because it was always unstable, fractured and contested.
A similar process was at work in China itself regarding the hair, with the Manchu assertion of hair over the population, followed by the Republic's assertion of its removal on the population. In both cases, relatively weak governments were using the hairstyles to symbolise power, but this was only necessary precisely because they were relatively weak.
Ultimately, by focusing so much on the Chinese male hairstyle as the defining racial characteristic, Westerners were also signifying that very little separated white from yellow. A few commentators even noted that: "It is the pigtail and the clothes which mislead us into believing in the exaggerated physical peculiarity of the Chinaman"; without the braided hairstyle, some Chinese men could even pass as a "better class of Englishmen.
150 By centralising the Chinese male hairstyle as a marker of racial difference, Europeans also unwittingly made that difference as superficial and impermanent as a hairstyle. This may explain why the image of the Chinese male lasted for decades in the West, long after it had ceased to exist in China itself. To depict the Chinese without their braid would have further blurred the already fuzzy racial binaries at work in empire.
What is also revealed in the story of the queue is the ways that settler societies sought to limit agency to themselves. It is clear that an assumption ran through Yellow Peril discourse: only whites had the agency and right to travel and to culturally appropriate. Many missionaries in China adopted fake queues as a way to blend in, to look "Chinese."
151 Similarly, adventure stories usually depicted the British hero at some point needing to use a fake queue to pretend to be Chinese in order to escape. 152 One witness during the government investigation suggested the scalps would work well as authentic costumes, so Europeans could pretend to be Chinese. While Europeans could dabble with such "authentic" Chineseness, Chinese men adopting Western dress and hair styling was usually met with fear and suspicion. Chinese super-villains would only don Western dress and cut their hair to further their fiendish plots. 153 Similarly, the Chinese caused anxiety precisely because migration was linked to empire-building, to European technological, physical and moral superiority. In the words of Margaret Allan: "The mobility of modernity was reserved for those deemed white." 154 The physical presence of Chinese men in settler societies was a constant proof that white settlers did not have a monopoly on culture or mobility. Settler societies were particularly prone to such anxieties precisely because they had Chinese settlers, almost exclusively male, and because these were places marked out for "white" domination. Such anxieties never took hold in the same way in places like Malaysia, for instance, despite significant Chinese migration there.
There is another story too, of real Chinese men with their own discourses around hairstyling, modernity and manhood at this time. We need to better understand the ways in which the image of the Chinese was constantly contested by Chinese men themselves, as living human bodies in these colonies engaging in this process of continual performance, of negotiation and renegotiation, with hair an important element of that discourse. 155 The debates within China and its diaspora about whether to maintain the distinctive hairstyle clearly indicated an engagement with European and settler colonial performative imaginings of the queue, and notions of modernity. Most societies consider hair extremely important, and human trophyism, especially the collecting of hair, should not be viewed as "barbaric," "ancient," or atypical. In colonial settings, transcultural interactions predicated on raced, may even have made this more common. Such an examination is particularly important, as it is still uncommon to get world histories which explore issues of gender and/or bodies. And yet the frequency with which hair has featured as a significant social signifier across the world, one highly gendered, suggests that this is an important history which must be seen within a global context. Historians would do well to remember that the histories of empires are primarily the histories of bodies moving around the world and interacting; a history which is inescapably gendered. Charting the history of the queue has been one method of charting that global history, and understanding the power dynamics at play within settler societies in particular.
